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Abstract. This article describes psychological findings on the confidence of eyewitnesses for their own
testimony and the reactions of jury members to eyewitness testimony. These findings are related to
adjudications of alleged security violations.
One constituent of security bureaucracies is a group of processes for adjudicating alleged security
violations. Common to many of these processes is the social configuration of a group, i.e., a de facto or
formal jury, evaluating a series of individuals, i.e., de facto or formal witnesses, concerning what the
latter have sensed and perceived. (There's actually an interaction here of evaluations of the eyewitness
with those of the testimony.) The evaluation of the group is usually crucial to the management of the
alleged security violations--including consequences for the (1) entity represented by the bureaucracy
and related allied, neutral, and adversary entities; (2) the bureaucracy itself; (3) structural, functional
and process aspects of the bureaucracy; and (4) individuals involved in the adjudication process
including those suspected or judged as perpetrators of security violations or violators of the adjudication
process.
Psychological research has clearly identified a number of problematic phenomena in the adjudication of
violations wherein eyewitness testimony is salient. For example, jurors--at least in some situations--(1)
ascribe more credibility to eyewitnesses than is warranted by the "arrived at facts," (2) cannot reliably
discriminate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses, (3) are not appropriately cognizant of the
variables and parameters that affect eyewitness credibility, and (4) seem to give undue credence to how
confident the witness appears. The last Issue often seems to significantly affect the others--again an
unfortunate phenomenon because confidence is many times a questionable index of accuracy even
proximal to the time of the event that was originally perceived by the eyewitness. Moreover, by the
time the alleged security violation is adjudicated, the frequency and intensity of repeated questioning by
investigators, information obtained concerning other witnesses, and briefings and practice sessions
conducted by trial lawyers and their representatives may unduly affect the confidence of the
eyewitness.
What does psychological research suggest about the modifiability of the above biases? Guidance and
instructions by judges, de facto and formal, and the "checks and balances" provided by crossexamination do not appear to be reliably salutary. However, expert psychological testimony does so
appear. Yet such testimony often is not requested or employed.
Even more than most alleged violations formally managed through the criminal justice system,
adjudications of alleged security violations may have profound implications, such as surprise military or
terrorist attacks, nuclear proliferation, subversion of economies, or information warfare through
unauthorized control of computerized processes. The sensitivity of these implications--as well as the
sources and methods of information permeating the initial identification and, then, adjudication of
alleged violations--may necessitate special approaches to all aspect of bureaucratic management.
Although appropriate ethical, moral, and legal oversight would seem indicated, so would a hard look at
the introduction of the expert political psychologist to increase the probability that what to believe
1
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1998

1

International Bulletin of Political Psychology, Vol. 4, Iss. 6 [1998], Art. 5

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
about what to believe should indeed be believed. (See Loftus, E.F. (1980). Impact of expert psychological
testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 9-15;
Penrod, S., & Cutler, B. (1995). Witness confidence and witness accuracy: Assessing their forensic
relation. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 4, 817-845; Stern, L.B., & Dunning, D. (1994). Distinguishing
accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications: A reality monitoring approach. In D.F. Ross, J.D.
Read, & M.P. Toglia (Eds.), Adult eyewitness testimony (pp. 273-299). NY: Cambridge University Press;
Wells, G.L., Rydell, S.M., & Seelau, E.P. (1993). On the selection of distractors for eyewitness lineups.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 835-844.) (Keywords: Intelligence, Organization, Testimony.)
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